Japan’s Takaichi leaves door open to reviewing non-nuclear policy

Aug. 7 (Asia Today) — Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said at a Hiroshima memorial ceremony that Japan “maintains” its three non-nuclear principles but stopped short of promising that the policy would remain unchanged, fueling speculation that her government could review a longstanding ban on allowing nuclear weapons into the country.

Takaichi made the remarks Thursday at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony marking the 81st anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombing of the city.

“Japan maintains the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and has a mission to continue efforts toward realizing a world without nuclear weapons,” Takaichi said.

Unlike previous prime ministers who pledged that Japan would “continue to uphold” the principles, Takaichi described the government’s current position without making an explicit commitment about the future.

The wording has drawn attention because her government plans to revise Japan’s three key national security documents by the end of the year.

At a news conference after the ceremony, Takaichi again said the government “maintains the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a matter of policy.”

Asked whether the principles would continue to be included in the revised security documents, however, she declined to commit, saying she would refrain from prejudging the outcome.

Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles state that the country will not possess nuclear weapons, will not produce them and will not permit their introduction into Japanese territory. The principles originated with a 1967 statement by then-Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and have remained a central element of Japan’s postwar nuclear policy.

Takaichi has previously questioned the third principle – the prohibition on allowing nuclear weapons into Japan.

Before becoming prime minister, she argued in a 2024 book that Japan should retain the commitments not to possess or produce nuclear weapons but that an absolute prohibition on their introduction was unrealistic.

Her argument was that barring port calls by U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons could limit the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella protecting Japan.

Takaichi has also said she opposed including language committing Japan to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles when the country’s current security documents were drafted in 2022.

Those positions have prompted speculation that the government could seek to modify the prohibition on introducing nuclear weapons rather than abandon all three principles.

The Japan Innovation Party has also called for a review of the third principle. In security policy recommendations submitted to the government in June, the party called for a “realistic review” of the ban on allowing nuclear weapons into Japan.

The debate comes as Tokyo and Washington deepen cooperation on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence.

Japan and the United States held an Extended Deterrence Dialogue in Tokyo in June, where Washington reaffirmed its commitment to defend Japan using the full range of U.S. capabilities, including nuclear weapons.

The two sides also discussed the modernization and adaptation of U.S. nuclear forces and Japan’s ongoing revision of its National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup Program.

There remains significant caution within the Japanese government and ruling Liberal Democratic Party, however.

Under existing government interpretations, Japan could respond flexibly in an extreme national emergency involving a U.S. vessel carrying nuclear weapons.

Some within the ruling party therefore question whether formally revising the non-nuclear principles would provide enough practical benefit to justify the political controversy it would create.

Critics also warn that changing the policy when Washington has not publicly demanded such a move could give China and North Korea additional grounds to portray Japan as expanding its military role.

The Liberal Democratic Party has so far prioritized other defense issues, including higher military spending and long-range strike capabilities, and did not include a review of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in its recommendations for revising the security documents.

Any change by Japan could also have implications for South Korea.

Seoul and Washington coordinate U.S. extended deterrence through the bilateral Nuclear Consultative Group. The United States has repeatedly committed to defending South Korea with the full range of its capabilities, including nuclear weapons.

If Japan were to allow temporary entry by U.S. nuclear weapons or port calls by nuclear-armed vessels, Washington would gain additional operational options for its nuclear forces in Northeast Asia.

Such a development could strengthen deterrence against North Korea and China but could also intensify debate over differences between U.S. extended deterrence arrangements with Japan and South Korea.

In South Korea, it could revive calls for the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear-sharing arrangements or an independent South Korean nuclear arsenal.

A revision of Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles, however, would not by itself mean that U.S. nuclear weapons would be permanently stationed in either Japan or South Korea.

Takaichi’s choice of language in Hiroshima therefore falls short of signaling that Japan intends to acquire nuclear weapons. It more narrowly suggests that her government wants room to reconsider restrictions that could affect the operation of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

How the principles are addressed in Japan’s revised security documents later this year could determine whether the issue develops into a broader debate over the future of extended nuclear deterrence among Japan, South Korea and the United States.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

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Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260807010002361